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Abstract. We develop cryptographically secure techniques to guarantee uncon-
ditional privacy for respondents to polls. Our constructions are efficient and prac-
tical, and are shown not to allow cheating respondents to affect the “tally” by
more than their own vote — which will be given the exact same weight as that
of other respondents. We demonstrate solutions to this problem based on both
traditional cryptographic techniques and quantum cryptography.
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1 Introduction
In some instances, privacy is a matter of keeping purchase information away from tele-
marketers, competitors, or other intruders. In other instances, privacy translates to secu-
rity against traffic analysis, such as for web browsing; or to security of personal location
information. In still other instances, which we study in this paper, privacy is a precon-
dition to being able to obtain answers to important questions. Two concrete examples
of instances of latter are elections and surveys/polls.
While the first of these examples is the one of the two that has received — by far
— the most attention in the field of cryptography, there are important reasons to de-
velop better privacy tools for polling. Surprisingly, the two examples (namely, elections
and polls), while quite similar at a first sight, are very different in their requirements.
Since it is typically the case that there is more funding available for providing privacy
in elections than in surveys and polls, it follows that the tallying process in the former
may involve more costly steps than that in the latter — whether the process is elec-
tronic (using, e.g., mix networks) or mechanic. Second, while in the case of the voting
scheme, we have that users need to entrust their privacy with some set of authorities,
it is often the case that there is less trust established between the parties in polls. Yet
another reason to treat the two situations separately is that elections involve many more
respondents than polls typically do, thereby allowing a unique opinion (e.g., vote) to
be hidden among many more in the case of elections than in the case of polls. Finally,
while elections require as exact tallying as is possible, statistical truths are both suf-
ficient and desirable in polls. This allows the use of polling techniques that are very
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different from election techniques — in terms of their cost; how tallying is done; and
how privacy is protected.
While not given much attention in cryptography, important work on polling has
been done in statistics. In particular, the randomized response technique (RRT) was
proposed by Warner [War65] in 1965, with the goal of being used in polls relating to
sensitive issues, such as drug abuse, sexual preferences and shoplifting. The underlying
idea behind Warner’s proposal is for respondents to randomize each response accord-
ing to a certain, and known, probability distribution. More precisely, they answer the
question truthfully with some probability pct > 1/2, while with a fixed and known
probability 1− pct they lie. Thus, users can always claim that their answer — if it is of
the “incriminating” type — was a lie. When evaluating all the answers of the poll, these
lies become statistically insignificant given a large enough sample (where the size of
the sample can be simply computed from the probability distribution governing lying.)
However, a pure RRT by itself is not well suited for all types of polls. E.g., it is
believed that people are more likely to vote for somebody who leads the polls than
somebody who is behind. Therefore, it could be politically valuable not to lie (as re-
quired by the protocol) in polls relating to ones political opinion, and therefore have
one’s “vote” assigned a greater weight. (This is the case since people with the opposite
opinion — if honestly following the protocol — will sometimes cast a vote according
to your opinion, but you would never cast a vote according to their opinion, assuming
you are willing to cheat.) While the results of the poll remain meaningful if everybody
cheats (i.e., tells the truth with a probability different from that specified by the proto-
col), this is not the case when only some people deviate from the desired behavior. Also,
while one might say that the increased weight in the polls is gained at the price of the
cheater’s privacy, this is not necessarily the case if the cheater claims to have followed
the protocol, and there is no evidence to the contrary.
To address the problem of cheating respondents in RRT, we propose the notion
of cryptographic randomized response technique (CRRT), which is a modification of
RRT that prevents cheating. We present three efficient protocols for CRRT; two of them
using classic cryptographic methods (and being efficient for different values of pct), and
one using quantum methods. Importantly, the quantum RRT protocol is implementable
by using contemporary technology. We give rigorous proofs of security for one of the
classical protocols and for the quantum protocol.
For all of our proposed solutions, the privacy of the respondent will be guaranteed
information-theoretically (more precisely, statistically). This is appropriate to stimulate
truthful feedback on topics that may affect the respondent for years, if not decades.
All proposed solutions also guarantee that the respondents reply based on the desired
probability distributions. Clearly, this requires that the respondent cannot determine the
outcome of the protocol (as viewed by the interviewer) before the end of the protocol.
Otherwise, he could simply halt the execution of the protocol to suppress answers in
which the communicated opinion was a lie. We will therefore require protocols to offer
privacy for the interviewer as well as for the respondent, meaning that the respondent
cannot learn what the outcome of the protocol is, as seen by the interviewer. (One could
relax this requirement slightly to allow the respondent to learn the outcome at the same
time as the interviewer does, or afterward.)
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While we believe that it is important to prevent the respondent from biasing the
outcome by selective halting (corresponding to the protocol being strongly secure), we
also describe simplified versions of our protocols in which this protection mechanism
is not available. Such simplified versions (which we refer to as weakly secure) can still
be useful in some situations. They may, for example, be used as the default scheme for
a given application — where they would be replaced by their strongly secure relatives
if too many interactions are halted prematurely. (The decision of when the shift would
be performed should be based on standard statistical methods, and will not be covered
herein.) The benefit of considering such dual modes is that the weakly secure versions
typically are computationally less demanding than the strongly secure versions.
Finally, we also discuss cryptographic enhancements to two alternative RRT tech-
niques. In the first, referred to as RRT-IQ, the respondent always gives the truthful
answer to the question he is presented with. However, with a certain probability, he is
presented with an Innocous Question instead of the intended question. A second alter-
native RRT technique is what is referred to as polychotomous RRT. In this version of
RRT, the respondent is given more than two possible options per question.
In particular, our first protocol uses a novel protocol for information-theoretically
secure verifiable oblivious transfer that enables easier zero-knowledge proofs on the
properties of the transferred values. The described protocol may also be useful in
other applications. We also note that our techniques have applications in the privacy-
preserving data-mining, see Section 3.
Outline. We first review the details of the randomized response technique (Section 2),
after which we review some related work in cryptography (Section 3). We then intro-
duce the cryptographic building blocks of our protocols (Section 4). We then describe
the functionality of our desired solution in terms of functional black boxes and protocol
requirements (Section 5). In Section 6, we present our secure CRRT protocols. In Sec-
tion 7 we describe cryptographic solutions to other variants of the standard RRT. The
appendix contains additional information about the new oblivious transfer protocol and
about the quantum RRT protocol.
2 Short Review of Randomized Response Technique
When polling on sensitive issues like sexual behavior or tax evasion, respondents often
deny their stigmatizing behavior due to the natural concern about their privacy. In 1965,
Warner [War65] proposed the Randomized Response Technique (RRT) for organiza-
tion of polls where an unbiased estimator (UE) to the summatory information — the
proportion of people belonging to a stigmatizing group A — can be recovered, while
the privacy of every individual respondent is protected statistically. Since then, different
variations of the RRT have been proposed in statistics, see [CM88] for a survey. These
different variations provide, for example, smaller variance, smaller privacy breaches,
optimality under different definitions of privacy, and ability to answer polychotomous
questions. Next we will give a short overview of three types of RRT.
RRT-W. In Wagner’s original method (RRT-W), the respondents provide a truthful
answer to the question “Do you belong to a stigmatizing group A?” with a certain
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fixed and publicly known probability pct > 1/2. With probability 1 − pct they lie —
i.e., answer the opposite question. Define πA to be the true proportion of the popula-
tion that belongs to A (or whose type is t = 1). Let pyes be the proportion of “yes”
responses in the poll. Clearly, in RRT-W the a priori probability of getting a “yes”
response is pyes = pct · πA + (1 − pct)(1 − πA). In the case of N players, L of
which answer “yes”, an UE of pyes is p̂yes = L/N , the sample proportion of “yes”
answers. From this, one can simply compute the unbiased estimator of πA. This equals
π̂A =
p̂yes−(1−pct)
2pct−1 =
pct−1
2pct−1 +
L
N
· 1(2pct−1) . Similarly, the variance var(π̂A) and its UE
can be computed.
RRT-IQ. An alternative RRT is the innocuous question method (RRT-IQ), first analyzed
in [GASH69]. When using RRT-IQ, the respondent answers the sensitive question with
a probability pct, while with probability 1−pct to an unrelated and innocuous question,
such as “Flip a coin. Did you get tails?”. The RRT-IQ achieves the same goals as RRT-
W but with less variance [CM88], which makes it more suitable for practical polling.
Many other RRT-IQs are known, including some with unknown estimate of the the
proportion of the population belonging to the innocuous group.
PRRT. The RRTs for dichotomous polling (where the answer is yes or no) can be
generalized to polychotomous RRT (PRRT) where the respondent can belong to one
of the m mutually exclusive groups A1, . . . , Am, some of which are stigmatizing. A
typical sensitive question of this kind is “When did you have your first child?”, with
answers “1 — while not married”, “2 — within 9 months after the wedding” and “3
— more than 9 months after the wedding”. In many cultures, the answer 1 is stigma-
tizing, the answer 3 is innocuous, while the answer 2 is somewhere inbetween. The
interviewer wants to know an UE for the proportion πi of people who belong to the
group Ai, i ∈ [1,m]. There are many possible PRRTs [CM88, Chapter 3]. One of the
simplest is the following technique PRRT-BD by Bourke and Dalenius [BD76]: first fix
the probabilities pct and p1, . . . , pm, such that pct +
∑
i∈[1,m] pi = 1. A respondent
either reveals her true type t ∈ [1,m] with probability pct, or answers i ∈ [1,m] with
probability pi. To recover an UE of pi := (π1, . . . , πm)T , define p := (p1, . . . , pm)T
and pans = (pans1 , . . . , pansm)T , where pansi is the proportion of people who answer i.
Then pans = pct · pi + p, and hence p̂i = p−1ct · (p̂ans − p).
3 Related Cryptographic Work.
In [KANG99], Kikuchi et al. propose techniques with similar goals as ours. Seemingly
unaware of the previous work on RRT, the authors reinvent this notion, and propose a
protocol for performing the data exchange. However, their protocol is considerably less
efficient than ours. Also, it does not offer strong security in our sense. This vulnerability
to cheating makes their protocol unsuitable for their main application (voting), as well
as polls where respondents may wish to bias their answer. Our protocols can be used in
their framework.
Our work has a relation to work on biased coin flipping, where heads must come out
with probability pct = ℓ/n. In our case, the coin can be biased by the first participant in
several ways, where the choice of the distribution encodes the opinion of the respondent
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to the poll. More concretely, consider a coin where one outcome (say, 1) corresponds
to “yes”, and the other (0) to “no”. Let us assume that the respondent should give his
correct opinion with 75% probability. Then, if his opinion is “yes”, the coin will have
bias 0.75, while it will have bias 0.25 if his opinion is “no”. However, our technique
is not merely a generalization of biased coin flipping, as we also want our protocols
to implement privacy. This is an issue that is not important in the context of ordinary
biased coin flipping.
In order to guarantee that responses are made according to the intended distribution,
we introduce a “blinding” requirement: we need our protocols to be constructed such
that they do not leak the response to the respondent — at least not until the response
has been delivered to the interviewer. From a bird’s eye’s view, this makes our proto-
cols similar to those in [JY96], in which a party proves either language membership or
language non-membership to a verifier, but without being able to determine which one.
However, the similarities between our protocols and those in [JY96] do not run much
deeper than that.
In contrast, there is a much closer relationship between our protocols and proto-
cols for oblivious transfer [Rab81,EGL85]. While our goals are orthogonal to those of
oblivious transfer, the techniques are hauntingly similar. In particular, one of our CRRT
protocols uses a protocol for oblivious transfer as a building block. While in principle
any such protocol can be used, it is clear that the properties of the building block will be
inherited by the main protocol. Therefore, in order to provide unconditional guarantees
of privacy for the respondents, we use a verifiable variant of the information theoretic
protocol for oblivious transfer, namely that proposed by Naor and Pinkas [NP01b]. (An
efficient protocol that offers computational security for the sender was proposed by
Tzeng [Tze02].)
Cryptographic randomized response techniques are also related to oblivious func-
tion evaluation [Gol02], where one party has data µ, while another party needs to com-
pute f(µ), without getting to know any additional information on µ, while the first party
will not get to know f . Cryptographic RRTs can be seen as protocols for oblivious func-
tion evaluation of some specific randomized functions f .
Furthermore, our work is related to the work on Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
— and even to privacy-preserving data-mining — in that the goal of our interviewer
is to retrieve some element from the respondent, without the latter learning what was
retrieved. More specifically, if some ℓ out of n elements represent the respondent’s
opinion, and the remaining n − ℓ elements represent the opposite opinion, then the
interviewer will learn the respondent’s opinion with probability ℓ/n if he retrieves a
random element. Of course, in order to guarantee the interviewer that the elements are
correctly formed, additional mechanisms are required.
In privacy-preserving data-mining a related data randomization approach has been
proposed [AS00]: namely, the users input their data to the central database (e.g., a loyal
customer inputs the name of the product he bought), and the database maintainer needs
to do some statistical analysis on the database. However, the maintainer should not be
able to recover individual items. Database randomization in the case when the main-
tainer is limited to the SUM function corresponds exactly to the RRT. For the same
reasons as in the RRT, one should not be able to bias the data. Our protocols are also
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applicable in the privacy-preserving data-mining and hopefully even in the case when
more elaborated randomizations [ESAG02] are applied.
4 Cryptographic Building Blocks
Assume that p is a large prime, and q, q | (p−1), is another prime. Then Zp has a unique
subgroup G of order q. Let g and h be two generators of G, such that nobody knows
their mutual discrete logarithms logg h and logh g. We let k be the security parameter,
in our setting we can take k = q. The key K consists of public parameters,K := (g;h).
Pedersen’s Commitment Scheme. In this scheme [Ped91], a message µ ∈ Zq is com-
mitted by drawing a random ρ ←R Zq , and setting CK(µ; ρ) := gµhρ. The commit-
ment can be opened by sending µ and ρ to the verifier. This scheme is homomorphic,
i.e., CK(µ; ρ)CK(µ′; ρ′) = CK(µ + µ′; ρ + ρ′). Since it is also perfectly hiding and
computationally binding, it can be used as a building block in efficient zero-knowledge
arguments, such as protocols for arguing the knowledge of plaintext µ.
Variant of Naor-Pinkas 1-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer. The oblivious transfer (OT)
protocol by Naor and Pinkas [NP01b] guarantees information-theoretic privacy for the
sender R, and computational privacy for the chooser I. Assume the sender R has a
vector µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ Mn for some set M ⊆ Zq . The chooser I has made a
choice σ ∈ [1, n]. The Naor-Pinkas protocol works as follows:
1. I generates random a, b← Zq and sends (A,B,C) ← (ga, gb, gab−σ+1) to R.
2. R performs the following, for i ∈ [1, n]: Generate random (ri, si). Compute wi ←
griAsi , compute an encryption yi of µi using vi ← Bri(C · gi−1)si as the key.
Send (wi, yi) to I.
3. I computes wbσ(= vσ) and decrypts yσ using vσ as the key, obtaining µσ .
(Both R and I halt if any received transcript is not correctly formatted.) Note that
wi = g
ri+asi
, while vi = Bri(C · gi−1)si = wbi · g(i−σ)si . Thus, vσ = wbσ , while
for i 6= σ, vi is a random element of G. Thus, in the third step R recovers vσ , while
obtaining no information about vi for i 6= σ.
The Naor and Pinkas [NP01b] paper does not specify the encryption method, men-
tioning only that the encryption scheme must be semantically secure. We propose to
use Pedersen’s commitment scheme instead of an encryption scheme. Herein, we use
K = (g;h) as the parameters of the commitment scheme, and use vi instead of ri as
the random coin, producing a commitment yi := CK(µi; vi). We denote this version
of Naor-Pinkas protocol, where yi is defined as yi = CK(µi, vi), by
(
1
n
)
-OTK(µ;σ).
(The full protocol is presented in Appendix A.)
The idea behind this unconventional trick is that as the result, the sender can argue
in zero-knowledge for all i ∈ [1, n] that the values µi satisfy some required conditions.
(We call such an OT protocol verifiable.) The chooser cannot decrypt yi without know-
ing vi, and thus he cannot guess the value of µi for i 6= σ (with probability higher than
|M |2/q, as we will show in Appendix A), even if he knows that µi is chosen from a
fixed two-element set. (This constitutes the security of OT protocol in the left-or-right
sense. See Appendix A.) On the other hand, I can “decrypt” yσ with the “key” vσ ,
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given that the possible message space M is small enough for the exhaustive search on
the set {gx : x ∈M} to be practical. In the case of dichotomous RRT, M = {0, 1}.
Noninteractive Zero-Knowledge Arguments. We will use zero-knowledge arguments
(and not proofs) of knowledge in our protocol, since they are (at the very least) statis-
tically hiding and computationally convincing. This property is important in a setting
where a verifier must not be able to extract additional information even if he is given
infinite time.
Our first protocol uses only two very standard statistical zero-knowledge arguments.
(The arguments for the second protocol are described in appendices.) The first one is
an argument that a given value yi (Pedersen-)commits to a Boolean value µi ∈ {0, 1}.
One can use standard disjunctive proofs [CDS94] for this. We denote the (possibly
parallelized) argument that this holds for i ∈ [1, n] by AKEncBool(y1, . . . , yn). The
second argument of knowledge, AKLin(y1, . . . , yn+1; a, b), is an argument that the
prover knows some set of values µi, for which yi is a commitment of µi, and such
that
∑
i≤n µi+ aµn+1 = b. This argument of knowledge can be constructed from Ped-
ersen’s commitment scheme by computing y ← ∏i≤n yi · yan+1 and then arguing that
the result y is a commitment to b. Note that such an argument of knowledge is secure
only when accompanied by zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge of the values µi;
for this purpose, we employ AKEncBool(y1, . . . , yn+1) as described above.
5 Security Definitions
In this section, we will give the definition of a weakly and strongly secure crypto-
graphic RRT (CRRT). The security definitions will be in accordance with the ones in
secure two-party computation [Gol02]. We will also explain why these requirements
are relevant in the case of CRRT.
Assume we have a concrete variant of RRT, like RRT-W or RRT-IQ. Let Φp be the
function that implements the desired functionality. For example, in the case of RRT-W,
Φpct(x) is a randomized function that with probability pct returns x, and with prob-
ability 1 − pct returns 1 − x. The ideal-world CRRT protocol, has three parties, the
interviewer I, the respondent R, and the trusted third party T . R has her type, tR as
her private input, while I has no private input. Then, R communicates tR to T , who
selects the value rR ← Φpct(tR) and sends rR to I. After that, the private output of
I will be Φpct(tR), while R will have no private output. It is required that at the end
of the protocol, the participants will have no information about the private inputs and
outputs of their partners, except for what can be deduced from their own private inputs
and outputs. In particular, I (resp. R) has no information about the value of tR (resp.
rR), except what they can deduce from their private inputs and outputs.
In an ideal world, exactly the next three types of attacks are possible [Gol02, Sec-
tion 2.1.2]: a party can (a) refuse to participate in the protocol; (b) substitute his private
input to the trusted third party with a different value; or (c) abort the protocol prema-
turely. In our case, the attack (c) is irrelevant, since R has no output. (Attack (c) models
the case when the first party halts the protocol after receiving his private output but
before the second party has enough information to compute her output.) Therefore, in
an ideal-world RRT protocol, we cannot protect against a participant, who (a) refuses
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to participate in polling (non-participation attack) or (b) claims that her type is 1− tR,
where tR is her real type (absolute denial attack). No other attacks should be possible.
Note that neither (a) nor (b) is traditionally considered an attack in the context of polling
or voting. The argument here is game-theoretic, and the solutions must be proposed by
mechanism design, instead of cryptography: namely, a non-manipulable mechanism
(e.g., the algorithm with which the election winner is determined from all the collected
votes) must be designed so that answering against one’s true type (or non-participation)
would not give more beneficial results to the respondent than the truthful answer.
On the other hand, as we stated, no other attacks should be allowed. This require-
ment is very strict, so we will explain why it is necessary in the RRT’s context. Clearly,
one must protect the privacy of R, since this is the primarily goal of a RRT. It is also
necessary to protect the privacy of I, although the reason here is more subtle. Namely,
if R obtains any additional information about rR before the end of the protocol (for
example, if she suspects that rR 6= tR), she might halt the protocol. Such a behavior by
a malicious respondent might cause a bias in the poll, as already explained. (Halting the
protocol while having no information on rR is equivalent to the non-participation at-
tack.) The third requirement on the protocol, of course, is that I either halts or receives
Φpct(x), where x is the input submitted by the R.
In a real-world implementation, we want to replace T by a cryptographic protocol
Π = (R, I) between R and I. This protocol (R, I) is assumed to be “indistinguish-
able” from the ideal-world protocol, that is, with a high probability, it should be secure
against all attacks that do not involve attacks (a) or (b). “Secure” means that the privacy
of R (resp. I) must be protected, if R (resp. I) follows the protocol, and that I either
halts, or receives the value Φpct(x), where x was the submitted value of R. The security
of the respondent should be information-theoretical, while the security of interviewer
can be computational. That is, a secure CRRT-W protocol must have the next three
properties (here, k is the security parameter):
Privacy of Respondent: Let I∗ be an algorithm. After the end of the protocol execution
(R, I∗), I∗ will have no more information on tR than it would have had after the
execution of the ideal world protocol. That is, assuming that viewI∗ is his view of the
protocol (R, I∗), define
Adv
pri−r
k (R, I∗) := |Pr[I∗(viewI∗ , rR) = tR]− Pr[tR|rR]| ,
where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of I∗ and R. We say that a
CRRT protocol is privacy-preserving for the respondent, if Advpri−rk (R, I∗) is negligi-
ble (in k) for any unbounded adversary I∗.
Privacy of Interviewer: Let R∗ be an algorithm. Assume that I halts when R∗ halts.
After the end of the protocol execution (R∗, I), R∗ will have no more information
on tR than it would have had after the execution of the ideal world protocol. That is,
assuming that viewR∗ is her view of the protocol (I,R∗), define
Adv
pri−i
k (R∗, I) := |Pr[R∗(viewR∗ , tR) = rR]− Pr[R∗(tR) = rR]| ,
where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of R∗ and I. We say that
a CRRT protocol is privacy-preserving for the interviewer, if for any adversary R∗, if
Adv
pri−i
k (R∗, I) ≤ ε and R∗ takes τ steps of computation then ετ is negligible (in k).
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Correctness: Let R∗(x) be an algorithm with private input x to the protocol (R∗, I).
Assume that I halts when R∗ halts. We require that at the end of the protocol execution
(R∗, I), I will either halt, or otherwise receive Φpct(x) with high probability. That is,
assuming that viewI is I’s view of the protocol (R∗, I), define
Adv
crct
k (R∗, I) := 1− Pr[I(viewI) = Φpct(x)|I does not halt] ,
where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of I and R∗. We say that a
CRRT protocol is correct, if for any adversary R∗, if AdvcrctI (R∗) = ε and R∗ takes up
to t steps of computation then ετ is negligible (in k).
We call a cryptographic RRT (CRRT) protocol weakly secure if it is privacy-
preserving for the respondent and correct. We call CRRT protocol (strongly) secure
if it is weakly secure and it is privacy-preserving for the interviewer. While a secure
CRRT protocol is preferable in many situations, there are settings where a weakly se-
cure CRRT protocol suffices, such as where halting can be easily detected and punished,
or means for state recovery prevent modifications between a first and second attempt of
executing the protocol.
6 Cryptographic RRT
We will propose three different CRRT-W protocols. In the first two protocols, the com-
mon parameters are pct = ℓ/n > 1/2; generators g and h whose mutual discrete logs
are unknown (at least by R); and K = (g;h). R has private input t = tR, and I’s
private output is rR.
CRRT Protocol Based on Oblivious Transfer. Our first implementation of RRT-W
is described in Protocol 1. The arguments of knowledge can be efficiently constructed,
see Sect. 4. Here, we can use AKLin(y1, . . . , yn+1; 2ℓ − n; ℓ) since
∑
i≤n µi + (2ℓ −
n)µn+1 = ℓ independently of the value of t. All the steps in this protocol must be
authenticated.
PRECOMPUTATION STEP:
1. R prepares n random bits µi ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ [1, n], such that
∑
µi = ℓ if t = 1 and∑
µi = n− ℓ if t = 0. Additionally, she sets µn+1 ← 1− t.
2. I chooses an index σ ∈ [1, n].
INTERACTIVE STEP:
1. I and R follow (1
n
)
-OTK(g
µ1 , . . . , gµn ; σ). I obtains gµσ , and computes µσ from that.
2. R sends to I noninteractive zero-knowledge arguments AKEncBool(y1, . . . , yn+1), and
AKLin(y1, . . . , yn+1; 2ℓ− n; ℓ).
3. I verifies the arguments, and halts if the verification fails.
Protocol 1: A secure CRRT-W protocol based on oblivious transfer
If we take the number of bits that must be committed as the efficiency measure
(communication complexity of the protocol), then our protocol has complexity O(n).
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In the polling application, one can most probably assume that n ≤ 5. The security
proofs of this protocol follow directly from the properties of underlying primitives. As
a direct corollary from Theorem 2, we get that Protocol 1 is privacy-preserving for re-
spondent (Advpri−rk (R, I∗) ≤ 2/q + O(1/q), where the constant comes in from the
use of statistically-hiding zero-knowledge arguments). It is privacy preserving for in-
terviewer, given the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. The correctness of
this protocol follows from the properties of the zero-knowledge arguments used under
the DDH assumption.
In a simplified weakly secure protocol based on the same idea, R commits
to all µi by computing and publishing yi ← CK(µi; ρi). Next, R argues that
AKEncBool(y1, . . . , yn+1), and AKLin(y1, . . . , yn+1; 2ℓ − n; ℓ). After that, I sends
σ to R, who then reveals µσ and ρσ . Upon obtaining these, I verifies the correctness of
the previous corresponding commitment, outputting µσ .
CRRT from Coin-Flipping. Protocol 2 depicts a secure CRRT-W protocol with com-
munication complexityΘ(d log2 n), where d := ⌈1/(1− pct)⌉, and pct = ℓ/n as previ-
ously. While in the common RRT application one can usually assume that n is relatively
small, this second protocol is useful in some specific game-theoretic applications where
for the best outcome, pct must have a very specific value. The idea behind this protocol
is that at least one of the integers µ+ν+ iℓ mod n must be in interval [0, ℓ−1], and at
least one of them must be in interval [ℓ, n− 1]. Hence, I gets necessary proofs for both
the 0 and the 1 answer, which is sufficient for his goal. For his choice to be accepted,
he must accompany the corresponding r with R-s signature on his commitment on σ.
PRECOMPUTATION STEP:
1. R chooses a random µ←R [0, n− 1].
2. I chooses random ν ←R [0, n− 1] and σ ←R [0, d− 1].
INTERACTIVE STEP:
1. R commits to t and µ, and sends the commitments to I.
2. I commits to σ, by setting y ← CK(σ; ρ) for some random ρ. He sends ν and y to R,
together with a zero-knowledge argument that y is a commitment of some i ∈ [0, d− 1].
3. R verifies the argument. She computes values µ′i, for i ∈ [0, d− 1], such that µ′i = t ⇐⇒
(µ + ν + iℓ mod n) < ℓ. She signs y, and sends her signature together with {µ′i} and
the next zero-knowledge argument for every i ∈ [0, d − 1]: [µ′i = t ⇐⇒ (µ + ν + iℓ
mod n) < ℓ].
4. After that, I sets rR ← µ′σ . He will accompany this withR-s signature on the commitment,
so that both R and third parties can verify it.
Protocol 2: A secure CRRT-W protocol based on coin-flipping
A weakly secure version of this protocol is especially efficient. There, one should
set d ← 1, and omit the steps in Protocol 2 that depend on σ being greater than 1.
(E.g., there is no need to commit to σ anymore.) Thus, such a protocol would have
communication complexity Θ(log2 n). Now, pct > 1/2 (otherwise one could just do a
bit-flip on the answers), and hence d > 2. On the other hand, the privacy of respondents
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PRECOMPUTATION STEP:
1. I chooses random u0 ←R [0, 1], u1 ←R [0, 1]. He generates quantum states |ψ0〉 =√
pct|u0〉+√1− pct|1− u0〉, |ψ1〉 = √pct|u1〉+√1− pct|1− u1〉.
2. R chooses a random i←R [0, 1].
INTERACTIVE STEP:
1. I sends |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 toR.
2. R sends i to I.
3. I sends ui to R.
4. R measures the state |ψi〉 in the basis |ψui〉 =
√
pct|ui〉 + √1− pct|1 − ui〉, |ψ⊥ui〉 =√
1− pct|ui〉 −√pct|1− ui〉 and halts if the result is not |ψui〉.
5. If the verification is passed, R performs the transformation |0〉 → |t〉, |1〉 → |1− t〉 on the
state |ψ1−i〉 and sends it back to I.
6. I measures the state in the basis |0〉, |1〉, gets outcome s. I outputs r ← ui ⊕ s.
Protocol 3: A quantum CRRT-W protocol.
is in danger if say pct ≥ 3/4. Thus, we may assume that d ∈ [3, 4]. Therefore, Protocol 2
will be more communication-efficient than Protocol 1 as soon as n/ log2 n > 4 ≥ d, or
n ≥ 16. The weakly secure version will be always more communication-efficient.
This protocol is especially efficient if the used commitment scheme is an integer
commitment scheme [FO99,DF02]. In this case, to argue that (µ+ ν+ iℓ mod n) < ℓ
one only must do the next two simple steps: first, argue that µ + ν + iℓ = z + en for
some z, e, and then, argue that z ∈ [0, ℓ− 1]. This can be done efficiently by using the
range proofs from [Bou00,Lip01]. One can also use Pedersen’s scheme, but this would
result in more complicated arguments.
Quantum-Cryptographic RRT. We also present a quantum CRRT protocol (see Pro-
tocol 3) that allows for a value pct that does not have to be a rational number, and which
provides a relaxed form of information-theoretic security to both parties. While not
secure by our previous definitions, it provides meaningfully low bounds on the proba-
bilities of success for a cheater. Namely, (a) if dishonest, R cannot make his vote count
as more than
√
2 votes: if pct = 12 + ε, then padv ≤ 12 +
√
2ε (we also show a slightly
better bound with a more complicated expression for padv, cf. Appendix B). (b) if dis-
honest strategy allows I to learn t with probability pct + ε, it also leads to I being
caught cheating with probability at least 2pct−12 ε. This form of security (information-
theoretic security with relaxed definitions) is common for quantum protocols for tasks
like bit commitment [ATVY00] or coin flipping [Amb01,SR02]. The security guaran-
tees of our quantum protocol compare quite well to ones achieved for those tasks. A
desirable property of this quantum protocol is that it can be implemented by using con-
temporary technology, since it only involves transmitting and measuring single qubits,
and no maintaining of coherent multi-qubit states.
To show the main ideas behind quantum protocol, we now show how to analyze a
simplified version of protocol 3. The security proof for the full protocol is quite compli-
cates and is given in appendix B. We also refer to appendix B for definitions of quantum
states and operations on them.
The simplified version of Protocol 3 is:
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1. I chooses a random u ←R [0, 1], prepares a quantum bit in the state |ψu〉 =√
pct|u〉+
√
1− pct|1− u〉 and sends it to R.
2. R performs a bit flip if her type t = 1, and sends the quantum bit back to I.
3. I measures the state in the computational basis |0〉, |1〉, gets answer s. The answer
is r = u⊕ s.
If both parties are honest, the state returned by respondent is unchanged:√pct|u〉+√
1− pct|1 − u〉 if t = 0 and √pct|1 − u〉 +
√
1− pct|u〉 if t = 1. Measuring this
state gives the correct answer with probability 1 − pct. Next, we show that respondent
is unable to misuse this protocol.
Theorem 1. For any respondent’s strategy R∗, the probability of honest interviewer I
getting r = 1 is between 1−pct and pct. Therefore, the previous protocol is both correct
and privacy-preserving for the interviewer.
Proof. We show that the probability of r = 1 is at most pct. The other direction is
similar. We first modify the (simplified) protocol by making R∗ to measure the state
and send the measured result to I, this does not change the result of the honest protocol
since the measurement remains the same. Also, any cheating strategy for R∗ in the
original protocol can be used in the new protocol as well. So, it is sufficient to bound
the probability of r = 1 in the new protocol.
Now, the answer is r = 1 if I sent |ψi〉 and R∗ sends back j, with i = j. Thus, we
have the setting of Fact 1 (see Appendix B.1). The rest is a calculation: to determine
the angle β between |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉, it suffices to determine the inner product which is
sinβ = 2
√
pct(1− pct). Therefore, cosβ =
√
1− sin2 β = 2pct − 1 and 12 + cos β2 =
pct. ⊓⊔
On the other hand, when using this simplified version, a dishonest interviewer I∗
can always learn t with probability 1. Namely, it suffices to send the state |0〉. If t = 0,
R sends |0〉 back unchanged. If t = 1, R applies a bit flip. The state becomes |1〉. I
can then distinguish |0〉 from |1〉 with certainty by a measurement in the computational
basis.
Note that this is similar to a classical “protocol”, where I first generates a random u
and sends a bit i that is equal to u with probability pct and 1−u with probability 1−pct.
R then flips the bit if t = 1 and sends it back unchanged if t = 0. The interviewer
XORs it with u, getting t with probability pct and 1 − t with probability 1 − pct. In
this ”protocol”, R can never cheat. However, I∗ can learn t with probability 1 by just
remembering i and XORing the answer with i instead of u. In the classical world, this
flaw is fatal because I cannot prove that he has generated i from the correct probability
distribution and has not kept a copy of i for himself. In the quantum case, I can prove
to R that he has correctly prepared the quantum state. Then, we get Protocol 3 with I
sending two states |ψu0〉 and |ψu1〉, one of which is verified and the other is used for
transmitting t. (See Appendix B for detailed analysis of this protocol.)
7 Protocols for Other RRTs and Extensions
Protocol for Cryptographic RRT-IQ. Recall that in one version of RRT-IQ, the re-
spondent would reply with his true opinion tR with a rational probability pct = ℓ/n,
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while he would otherwise flip a coin and answer whether it came up tails. Like for
CRRT-W, it is important to guarantee the use of correct distributions. Protocol 1 can
be easily changed to work for this version of RRT-IQ. Instead of n random bits, R
prepares 2n random bits µi, so that
∑
µi = n + ℓ if tR = 1, and
∑
µi = n − ℓ if
tR = 0. She also prepares a checksum bit µ2n+1 = 1 − tR. The rest of the proto-
col is principally the same as in Protocol 1, with n changed to 2n, and R arguing that
AKLin(y1, . . . , y2n+1; 2ℓ; 2n− ℓ).
Protocol for Cryptographic PRRT-BD. The next protocol is a modification of Pro-
tocol 1 as well. Let pi be such that pct +
∑
i∈[1,m] pi = 1, and assume that every
respondent has a type tR ∈ [1,m]. Assume pct = ℓ/n, pi = ℓi/n and that pi = 0 if
i 6∈ [1,m]. Assume D ≥ max(ℓ, ℓ1, . . . , ℓm) + 1. The respondent prepares n numbers
Dµi , such that ♯{i : µi = tR} = ℓtR + ℓ, and ♯{i : µi = j} = ℓj , if j 6= tR. Then the
interviewer and respondent will execute a variant of OT with choice σ, during which
the interviewer only gets to know the value µσ. Then the respondent argues that the sum
of all commitments is a commitment to the value
∑
ℓiD
µi + ℓDj , for some j ∈ [1,m],
by using range-proofs in exponents [LAN02]. (A more efficient proof methodology
is available when D is a prime [LAN02], given that one uses an integer commitment
scheme.) Additionally, she argues that every single commitment corresponds to a value
Di for i ∈ [1,m], also using range-proofs of exponents [LAN02]. After the OT step, the
interviewer gets gµσ , and recovers µσ from it efficiently. (Note that m ≤ 10 is typical
in the context of polling.)
Extensions to Hierarchies of Interviewers. One can consider a hierarchy of interview-
ers, reporting to some central authority. If there is a trust relationship between these two
types of parties, no changes to our protocol would be required. However, if the cen-
tral authority would like to be able to avoid having to trust interviewers, the following
modifications could be performed. First, each respondent would have to authenticate
the transcript he generates, whether with a standard signature scheme, a group signa-
ture scheme, etc. Second, and in order to prevent collusions between interviewers and
respondents, the interviewers must not be allowed to know the choice σ made in a
particular interview. Thus, the triple (A,B,C) normally generated by the interviewer
during the Naor-Pinkas OT protocol would instead have to be generated by the central
authority, and kept secret by the same. More efficient versions of proxy OT satisfying
our other requirements are beneficial for this application [NP01a].
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A Security of Modified Oblivious Transfer Protocol
From our oblivious transfer protocol
(
1
n
)
-OTK(µ;σ) we will require that it must be
secure in the next sense. The attack scenario consists of the following game. The
chooser I∗ chooses σ and two different vectors, µ[1] = (µ[1]1, . . . , µ[1]n) ∈ Mn
and µ[2] = (µ[1]1, . . . , µ[1]n) ∈ Mn, such that µ[1]σ = µ[2]σ . Denote an I∗ that has
made such choices by I∗(µ[1], µ[2]). He submits both tuples to the responder, who flips
a fair coin b ←R [1, 2]. After that, the chooser and the responder execute the protocol(
1
n
)
-OTK(µ[b];σ). After receiving µ[b]σ, I∗ guesses the value of b. Let Advlork (I∗,R)
be the probability that I∗ guesses the correct b, where probability is taken over the in-
ternal coin tosses of I∗ and R. We say that the oblivious transfer protocol is ε-secure
in the left-or-right sense, if for any unbounded algorithm I∗, Advlork (I∗,R) ≤ ε.
Recall that the proposed variant of the Naor-Pinkas protocol works as follows:
1. I generates random a, b← Zq and sends (A,B,C) ← (ga, gb, gab−σ+1) to R.
2. R performs the following, for i ∈ [1, n]: Generate random (ri, si). Compute wi ←
griAsi , compute an encryption yi ← gµihvi , where vi ← Bri(C · gi−1)si . Send
(wi, yi) to I.
3. I computes wbσ(= vσ) and recovers gµσ ← yσ/hw
b
σ
.
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Theorem 2. Let
(
1
n
)
-OTK(·; ·) be the described oblivious transfer protocol. (a) If a
malicious R∗ can guess the value of σ with advantage ε, then he can solve the Deci-
sional Diffie Hellman (DDH) problem with the same probability and in approximately
the same time. (v) This protocol is (m − d)(m − 1)/q ≤ m(m − 1)/q-secure in the
left-or-right sense, where d := q mod m and m := |M |.
Proof (Sketch.). (a) Assume that R∗ can guess σ with probability ε, given her view
(A,B,C) = (ga, gb, gab−σ+1). But then she can solve the DDH problem (given
(ga, gb, gc) for random a and b, decide whether c = ab or not) with probability ε:
given an input (ga, gb, gc), she just computes such a σ, for which c = ab−σ+1. After
that, she only has to check whether σ = 1 or not.
(b) W.l.o.g., assume that σ = 1. Define ν[j] to be a vector, for which which ν[j]i =
µ[1]i if i > j, and ν[j]i = µ[2]i if i ≤ j. Thus ν[1] = µ[1] (since µ[1]1 = µ[2]1),
while ν[n] = µ[2], and for all j, ν[j− 1] and ν[j] differ only in the jth element ν[j]j 6=
ν[j+1]j . Thus, our goal is to show that I∗(ν[1], ν[n]) ≤ m(m− 1)/q. For this we will
prove that I∗(ν[j − 1], ν[j]) ≤ (m− d)/q ≤ m/q for every j ∈ [2, n] and then use the
triangle equality to establish that Advlork (I∗(µ[1], µ[2]),R) ≤
∑
i=2n Adv
lor
k (I∗(ν[j −
1], ν[j]),R).
Now, fix a j ∈ [2, n]. After the protocol execution (I∗,R), R flipping the coin
b ←R [1, 2], I∗ must guess the value of b, based on his private input (µ[1], µ[2]), his
private output µ[b]1, and the protocol view. Since ν[j − 1]i = ν[j]i for i 6= j, this is
equivalent to guessing whether ν[j−2+b]j = ν[j−1]j or ν[j−2+b]j = ν[j]b. Clearly,
his success is maximized here when ν[j − 1]j 6= ν[j]j . Next, I∗’s view consists of
(A,B,C; {(wj , yj)}), where (wj , yj) ← (grjAsj , gµjhBrj ·(C·gj−1)sj ) for A, B and C
chosen by himself. Since I∗ is unbounded, he can find the value of α 6= 0, and therefore
he knows that (wj , yj) = (grj+asj , gµj+αB
rj (C·gj−1)sj ). Since rj and sj are randomly
chosen by a honest R, then the elements wj look completely random to I∗, and do not
help in guessing the value of µj . He also cannot use any information in (wj , yj), j 6= j,
since these values do not depend on µj .
Thus, to guess the value ν[j − 2 + b]j , he must find a bias in the value
aBrj (Cgj−1)sj = αgbrj+(ab+j−σ)sj mod q. Note that x := αgbrj+(ab+j−σ)sj is a
random element of Z∗p due to the choice of rj and sj , unless b = ab + j − σ = 0.
The latter will automatically hold if i = σ, but only with a negligible probability oth-
erwise. Thus, we can assume that x is chosen randomly from Z∗p. Guessing µj ∈ Zm
from yj is equivalent to guessing the value (x mod q) mod m. Denote e := ⌊q/m⌋.
Since q | (p − 1) then x mod q is a random element of Zq , and ♯{x : x mod q
mod m = j} ∈ e + c, where c ∈ {0, 1} is 1 iff j < d. Thus the best strat-
egy of I∗ is to guess that x is equivalent to some element j < d, and equivalently,
that ν[j − 2 + b]j mod m ≥ d. He will achieve this by choosing exactly one of
the two element ν[j − 1]b and ν[j − 1]b to have residue modulo m that is less than
d. Then he will succeed with probability e/q + 1/q which gives him an advantage
e/q + 1/q − 1/m = (m− d)/q ≤ m/q over random guessing the bit b. ⊓⊔
Security in the left-or-right sense is both necessary and sufficient for our purposes.
Namely, in the RRT-W protocol (Sect. 6), the interviewer I∗ knows that the input is —
up to the permutation of indices — one of the two values. For small n, the number of
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permutations is small, and thus with a high probability I∗ can guess that µ is one of
the two, known for him, Boolean vectors. Without security in the left-or-right sense, he
would be able to guess which of the two vectors is currently used, and thus to find the
type of the respondent. On the other hand, if the oblivious transfer protocol is secure in
the left-or-right sense, I∗ cannot predict the Hamming weight wh(µ) = ♯{i : µ1 = 1}
of R’s input.
B Detailed Quantum CRRT
B.1 Background on Quantum Information
In this section, we describe the basic notions of quantum information needed to under-
stand the quantum protocol and the analysis of its simplified version in section 6.
For a more detailed introduction to quantum information, we refer to book by
Nielsen and Chuang [NC00]. A qubit is the basic unit of quantum information, sim-
ilar to a bit in the conventional (classical) computing. A qubit has two basis states that
are denoted by |0〉 and |1〉. A general state of a qubit is α|0〉 + β|1〉, with α, β being
complex numbers with |α|2 + |β|2 = 1.
We can perform two types of operations on quantum bits: unitary transformations
and measurements. The simplest measurement of of a qubit α|0〉 + β|1〉 is in the com-
putational basis that gives the result 0 with probability |α|2 and 1 with probability |β|2.
The state of the qubit then becomes |0〉 or |1〉. Therefore, repeating the measurement
gives the same outcome. As long as we only consider this one type of measurement,
the state α|0〉 + β|1〉 behaves similarly to a probabilistic state that has been prepared
as 0 with probability |α|2 and 1 with probability |β|2. This analogy disappears, though,
when we consider other transformations. A unitary transformation is a linear transfor-
mation on the two-dimensional space of all α|0〉+ β|1〉 that preserves the vector norm.
Two examples of unitary transformations are the identity I(α|0〉+β|1〉) = α|0〉+β|1〉
and the bit flip X(α|0〉+ β|1〉) = α|1〉+ β|0〉. A general von Neumann measurement
on a qubit |Ψ〉 is specified by two orthogonal vectors |Φ0〉 and |Φ1〉. The outcome is
either 0 or 1; the probability of outcome i is equal to the squared inner product of |Ψ〉
and |Φi〉. The state of the qubit becomes |Φi〉. This measurement can be reduced to the
measurement in the computational basis as follows. We take a unitary U that maps |Φ0〉
to |0〉 and |Φ1〉 to |1〉. We apply U to the state |Ψ〉 that we want to measure. Then, we
measure the resulting state in the computational basis and apply U−1.
Distinguishability. Assume someone prepares two states |Φ0〉 and |Φ1〉, flips a fair coin
i ←R [0, 1], and sends |Φi〉 it to us. We would like to guess i by measuring the state.
We measure our success by the probability that our guess j ∈ {0, 1} coincides with i.
If |Φ0〉 and |Φ1〉 are orthogonal, a von Neumann measurement in |Φ0〉, |Φ1〉 basis tells
i with certainty. For non-orthogonal states, no measurement gives i with certainty.
Fact 1 [NC00] The maximum success probability with what we can distinguish |Φ0〉
from |Φ1〉 is 12 + sin β2 , β being the angle between |Φ0〉 and |Φ1〉.
The above definitions are sufficient to understand the protocol and the analysis of
simplified version in section 6. For the full security proof, more advanced notions like
density matrices are needed, which are described in Sect. B.2.
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B.2 Density Matrices
To prove the security of protocol 3, we need the more advanced formalism of density
matrices. We interpret |ψ〉 = α|0〉 + β|1〉 as a column vector (α, β)T . Let 〈ψ| denote
a row vector (α∗β∗), with ∗ being the complex conjugation operator. Then, the density
matrix of |ψ〉 is
|ψ〉〈ψ| =
(
α
β
)
(α∗β∗) =
(
αα∗ αβ∗
βα∗ ββ∗
)
.
Next, assume that we generate a classical random variable that is i with probability
pi and then prepare a quantum state |ψi〉 dependent on i. This creates a mixed quantum
state. It can be also described by a density matrix ρ =
∑
i pi|ψi〉〈ψi|. If we measure
a mixed state with a density matrix ρ in a basis |Φ0〉, |Φ1〉, the probability of getting
outcome i is 〈Φi|ρ|Φi〉 (i.e., we multiply the density matrix with the row vector 〈Φi|
on the left and the column vector |Φi〉 on the right and get a number which is the
probability). The following is a counterpart of Fact 1 for mixed states.
Fact 2 [NC00] The maximum success probability with which we can distinguish ρ0
from ρ1 is 12 + ‖ρ0−ρ1‖t4 , where ‖A‖t is the trace norm of A (the trace (sum of diagonal
entries) of matrix
√
A⊤A).
B.3 Security Proofs for Protocol 3
Security against Malicious Interviewer.
Theorem 3. If a strategy for dishonest I∗ leads to being caught with probability at
most ε, I∗ can learn r correctly with probability at most pct + 22pct−1ε.
The security of this type (cheating is possible but not without risk of being de-
tected) is common to many quantum protocols, for example quantum bit commitment
[ATVY00] or coin flipping [SR02]. We note that our security guarantee is stronger than
one achieved in [ATVY00]. Namely, in the bit commitment protocol of [ATVY00], a
dishonest party can successfully cheat with probability ε so that the probability of being
detected is just O(ε2).
Proof (Theorem 3). Assume that we are given a strategy for dishonest I∗. First, notice
that if we reverse the roles of |0〉 and |1〉 everywhere in this strategy, both the probability
of passing the test and the probability of learning t correctly remain the same. Therefore,
we can assume that the protocol is symmetric w.r.t. switching |0〉 and |1〉.
Consider the state of the first quantum bit sent by I∗. In the general case, I∗ can
send probabilistic combinations of various quantum states. Therefore, the first quantum
bit can be in a mixed state with some density matrix
ρ =
(
a α+ βi
α− βi b
)
.
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Since the strategy is symmetric w.r.t. switching |0〉 and |1〉, ρ must be also symmetric
in the same sense, implying that a = b = 1/2 and β = 0. Thus,
ρ =
(
1/2 α
α 1/2
)
.
If I is honest, α =
√
pct(1− pct). Theorem 3 follows from the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. The probability of I∗ failing the test if the first quantum bit is chosen for
verification is at least (√pct(1− pct)− α)√pct(1− pct).
Lemma 2. The probability of I∗ learning t correctly if the first bit is used for protocol
and the second bit used for verification is at most 12 +
√
1−4α2
2 .
We will for a moment assume the validity of these theorems (their proofs are given
slightly later), and will now continue with the proof of the theorem.
Let ε be the probability with which I∗ allows to be caught. By Lemma 1,
(
√
pct(1− pct)− α)
√
pct(1− pct) ≤ ε. Therefore, α ≥
√
pct(1− pct)− ε√
pct(1−pct)
.
By substituting that into Lemma 2, we get 12+
√
1−4α2
2 ≤ 12+
√
1−4pct(1−pct)+8ε
2 . If I is
honest, the probability that r = t is 12 +
√
1−4pct(1−pct)
2 . The extra advantage gained by
I∗ is at most
√
1−4pct(1−pct)+8ε
2 −
√
1−4pct(1−pct)
2 ≤ 2ε2pct−1 (assuming that pct > 1/2).⊓⊔
Proof (Lemma 1). When the first bit is chosen for verification, I∗ either claims that
it is |ψ0〉 or |ψ1〉. By symmetry, the probability of each of those is 1/2. We partition
ρ = 12ρ0 +
1
2ρ1, with ρi being the part for which I∗ claims that the state is |ψi〉. Let
ρ0 =
(
a′ α′
α′ b′
)
.
By symmetry, ρ1 should be the same with |0〉 and |1〉 reversed:
ρ1 =
(
b′ α′
α′ a′
)
.
Since ρ = 12ρ0 +
1
2ρ1, a
′ + b′ = 1 and α′ = α. Therefore, we have
ρ0 =
(
a′ α
α 1− a′
)
.
The probability of this state passing verification as |ψ0〉 is
〈Ψ0|ρ0|Ψ0〉 =
(√
pct
√
1− pct
)(a′ α
α 1− a′
)( √
pct√
1− pct
)
=a′pct + (1− a′)(1− pct) + 2α
√
pct(1− pct)
≤p2ct + (1− pct)2 + 2α
√
pct(1− pct)
=(pct + (1 − pct))2 − (
√
pct(1 − pct)− α)
√
pct(1− pct)
=1− (
√
pct(1− pct)− α)
√
pct(1− pct) .
⊓⊔
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Proof (Lemma 2). We assume that the second qubit has been prepared perfectly and its
verification always succeeds. (If I∗ cheated in preparing the second qubit as well, this
only decreases the probability of success for I∗ and the claim that we prove remains
valid.)
After the test is passed on the second qubit, R has the first qubit in the mixed
state ρ. The mixed state ρ is the same as one obtained by taking 1√
2
|0〉 + 1√
2
|1〉 with
probability 2α and |0〉, |1〉 with probabilities 12 − α each. Therefore, the joint state
of I∗ and R is equivalent to |ψ(R,I∗)〉 =
√
1
2 − α|0〉I∗ |0〉R +
√
1
2 − α|1〉I∗ |1〉R +√
2α|2〉I∗( 1√2 |0〉 + 1√2 |1〉)R. If R’s secret bit t = 0, he just sends his part back to
I∗. After that, I∗ possesses the entire state |ψ(R,I∗)〉. Otherwise, R flips the qubit be-
fore sending back and I∗ gets |ψ′(R,I∗)〉 =
√
1
2 − α|0〉I∗ |1〉R +
√
1
2 − α|1〉I∗ |0〉R +√
2α|2〉I∗( 1√2 |0〉 + 1√2 |1〉)R. Now, the question is how well can I∗ distinguish these
two states. By Fact 1, the best probability with which he can get t is 12 +
sin β
2 =
1
2 +
√
1−cos2 β
2 where β is the angle between the two states. cosβ is equal to the inner
product of |ψ(R,I∗)〉 and |ψ′(R,I∗)〉 which is 2α ( because the first two components of
|ψ(R,I∗)〉 are orthogonal to the first two components of |ψ′(R,I∗)〉 but the third compo-
nent is equal). ⊓⊔
Security against Malicious Respondent.
Theorem 4. Let pct < 12 +
√
3
4 = 0.933.... If I is honest, R∗ cannot achieve t = 0 (or
t = 1) with probability more than padv ≤ 12 +
√√
4pct − 4p2ct − (4pct − 4p2ct).
The probability padv remains less than 1 for all pct < 0.933.... Thus, our protocol
offers nontrivial security guarantees for all pct < 0.933.... Since the expression for padv
is quite complicated, we also present a simple but less precise bound. Let pct = 12 + ǫ.
Then, padv ≤ 12 +
√
2ǫ. Informally, this means that no R∗ can make his vote count
as more than
√
2 votes. This gives a non-trivial bound on padv for pct < 12 +
1
2
√
2
=
0.853....
If 0.853... ≤ pct ≤ 0.933..., then 12 +
√
2ǫ ≥ 1 but padv < 1 which can be seen by
evaluating the expression of theorem 4 directly.
Proof. There are four possible states that a responder can receive from an honest I:
|ψ0〉|ψ0〉, |ψ0〉|ψ1〉, |ψ1〉|ψ0〉, |ψ1〉|ψ1〉. An honest responder then randomly requests to
verify one of two quantum bits. A dishonest R∗ can measure the state and then decide
to verify one of two bits based on the result of the measurement so that his chances of
guessing the other state are maximized. Without loss of generality, R∗’s measurement
has two outcomes: 0 and 1 and the index i that is sent back to I is equal to the outcome
of the measurement. Then, we have
|ψu0ψu1〉 = αu0u1 |0〉|ψ′u0u1〉+ βu0u1 |1〉|ψ′′u0u1〉,
where the first qubit is the one being measured and |ψ′u0u1〉 (|ψ′′u0u1〉) is the rest of the
quantum state that remains with I after the measurement. By symmetry, we can assume
that αu0u1 = βu0u1 = 1√2 .
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Similarly to the simplified protocol in Sect. 6, the probability of R∗ fixing r = 0
(or r = 1) is equal to the probability that he correctly guesses u1−i. We bound this
probability. For brevity, assume that R∗ has requested u1 from I and received u1 = 0.
Then, if u0 = 0, his remaining state is |ψ′00〉 and, if u0 = 1, his remaining state is |ψ′10〉.
The probability with which he can guess u0 is, by Fact 1, at most padv = 12+
sinβ′
2 where
β′ is the angle between |ψ′00〉 and |ψ′10〉. Remember that, by analysis of Sect. 6, the
probability of r = t in the honest case is described by similar expression pct = 12+
sin β
2
where β is the angle between |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉.
Next, we express β′ by β. Remember that 〈ψ|ψ′〉 denotes the inner product between
|ψ〉 and |ψ′〉. The inner product 〈ψ0|ψ1〉 is equal to cosβ. The inner product between
|ψ0〉|ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉|ψ0〉 is the same cosβ because the second qubit is in the same state in
both cases. This inner product is also equal to 12 〈ψ′00|ψ′10〉+ 12 〈ψ′′00|ψ′′10〉. The first part
is cosβ′, the second part is at most 1. Therefore, 12 (cosβ
′ + 1) ≥ cosβ and cosβ′ ≥
2 cosβ − 1. We have sinβ′ =
√
1− cos2 β′ ≤
√
4(cosβ − cos2 β) and padv ≤ 12 +
sin β′
2 ≤ 12 +
√
cosβ − cos2 β. Remember that in the honest protocol, the probability
that r = t is pct = 12 +
sin β
2 . Therefore, sinβ = 2pct − 1, cosβ =
√
1− sin2 β =√
4pct − 4p2ct and, by substituting this into padv ≤ 12 +
√
cosβ − cos2 β, we get the
theorem. ⊓⊔
To show the padv ≤ 12 +
√
2ǫ upper bound, it suffices to show
√
cosβ − cos2 β ≤√
2ǫ. Since ǫ = sin β2 , this follows from√
cosβ − cos2 β
(sinβ)/2
=
2
√
cosβ − cos2 β√
1− cos2 β =
2
√
cosβ√
1 + cosβ
≤ 2
√
cosβ√
2 cosβ
=
√
2
